Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Communication models: A communication model illustrates the process of information exchange between sender and receiver. It typically includes components like encoding (sender's creation of a message), transmission (conveyance through a channel), decoding (receiver's interpretation), and feedback (response influencing subsequent communication). Models like Shannon-Weaver or Berlo's S-M-C-R depict elements and flow of communication interactions, aiding in understanding communication dynamics. See also Broadcasting model, Network model._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Rachel E. Kranton on Communication Models - Dictionary of Arguments
Kranton I 424 Communication Models/Benchmark Models/Agents/Bloch/Demange/Kranton: There is a population of |N| = n agents, and two possible states of nature, θ ∈ {0, 1}. Agents: earn payoffs from a collective decision, or outcome; let x ∈ {0, 1} denote the outcome. There are two types of agents, with different preferences: a) Unbiased agents: (set U): prefer the outcome to match the state of nature. b) Biased agents: (set B) prefer outcome x= 1 to be implemented, regardless of the state of nature. The number of biased and unbiased agents in the population is common knowledge. Agents have a common prior belief that θ = 1 with probability π. We assume π < 1/2 so that agents initially believe the true state is 0 with higher probability. With this initial prior, agents are particularly interested in credible information that the outcome is 1. Interaction: between agents is divided into three phases: (i) a message creation phase, (ii) a communication phase and (iii) a collective vote phase. Kranton I 425 Communication/Benchmark Models/Communication Models/Nash Equilibrium/Kranton: We consider two benchmark models of communication (…). In the “public broadcast model”, the recipient agent broadcasts his message directly to all other agents. In the “network communication model”, agents are organized along a social network. Agent i receives a message m(j) from one of his neighbors j and chooses whether to transmit his message to all other neighbors or not. >Broadcasting, >Network Model. After all possible communication has taken place, agents vote between two alternatives, 0 and 1. Each biased agent votes for Kranton I 426 outcome 1 regardless of his posterior. Each unbiased agent votes for outcome x = 1 if π > 1/2, and votes for outcome 0 if π < 1/2 (…). (…) it is optimal for unbiased agents to vote according to their beliefs. Nash equilibrium: a nash equilibrium of the voting game consists of the following strategies [.] Each unbiased agent i votes for outcome x = 1 if π > 1/2, votes for outcome x = 0 if π < 1/2, and votes for 0 and 1 with equal probability if π = 1/2. Each unbiased agent votes for outcome x = 1.” (…) we presume that agents reach the collective decision in such a manner and therefore have an incentive to communicate information that influences others’ posteriors and hence their “votes.” Unbiased agents’ prior beliefs are that state 0 is more likely and therefore vote for outcome 0 if there is no possibility of communication. A particular benefit of communication is then learning that 1 is more likely the true state. Francis Bloch, Gabrielle Demange & Rachel Kranton, 2018. "Rumors And Social Networks," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 59(2), pages 421-448._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Kranton I Rachel E. Kranton Francis Bloch Gabrielle Demange, Rumors And Social Networks 2018 Kranton II Rachel E. Kranton George A. Akerlof Identity Economics: How Our Identities Shape Our Work, Wages, and Well-Being Princeton 2011 |
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