Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Formalism: the thesis that statements acquire their meaning only from the rules for substituting, inserting, eliminating, forming, equality and inequality of symbols within a calculus or system. See also calculus, meaning, rules, content, correctness, systems, truth._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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W.V.O. Quine on Formalism - Dictionary of Arguments
XIII 63 Formalism/Quine: deduction is useful if you have previously doubted the truth of the result. XIII 64 For example, you can test a hypothesis by looking at the consequences of it. Euclid: had difficulties to prove theorems, the truth of which nobody doubted anymore. Elegance/Science/Euclid: he already tried, for reasons of simplicity, to limit his postulates. Deduction/Problem/Quine: how can we prevent our already existing knowledge (about the objects ("what is true")) from creeping into the evidence? One tries to simulate ignorance, but what is the point? Knowledge/Truth/Quine/(s): To "know what is true" is more a knowledge of objects than of logic (see below). Disinterpretation/Reinterpretation/Interpretation/Tradition/Quine: one possibility was reinterpretation: in which it was assumed that the logical constants retained their meaning, but the other terms were merely regarded as provisional. And that in the theorem to be proved as well as in its consequences ((s) thus practically then in everyday use, everyday language). Pure Mathematics/Quine: this led many authors to regard their object as intrinsically uninterpreted. Pure Mathematics/Formalism/Russell: here we never know what we are talking about or if what we are saying is true. QuineVsFormalism/QuineVsRussell: in his favour, he has quickly forgotten that again. XIII 65 Pure Mathematics/Science/Quine: seems to be on a par with the other sciences. Pure arithmetic, for example, has to do with pure numbers that count objects, but also electrons in the economy. Variables: go over numbers as well as over objects. Example: speed of light: here a relation is determined between a pure number (300,000) and light waves. Thereby not the number is emphasized as special, but the relation. Example: price: here the number is formed neither by the object, nor by the currency. ((s) Solution/((s): Relation instead of predicate.) Quine: relation instead of pure numbers and "pure object". QuineVsDisinterpretation/Disinterpretation/Quine: the purity of pure mathematics is not based on reinterpretation! Arithmetic/Quine: is simply concerned with numbers, not with objects of daily life. Abstract Algebra/Quine: if it exists, it is simply the theory of classes and relations. But classes and relations of all possible things, not only abstract ones. XIII 66 Logic/Quine: there was a similar problem as before with deduction, where we had to suspend our previous knowledge about objects: how can we suspend our previous knowledge about conclusions? Solution/Frege/Tradition: again through disinterpretation, but this time of the particle. (>Formalism). Formalism/Quine: ironically, it spares us from ultimate disinterpretation. We can extend the conclusions allowed by our signs. We can be sure that they are not altered by the meanings of the signs. Frege/Russell/Principia Mathematica/Quine: the Principia Mathematica(1) was a step backwards from Frege's conceptual writing in terms of formalistic rigor. 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
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