Economics Dictionary of Arguments

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Colours: in philosophy, the problem of coulour is, among other things, the question of how individual sensory impressions can be generalized or objectified. See also qualities, qualia, perception, inverted spectra, private language.
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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

W.V.O. Quine on Colour - Dictionary of Arguments

I 85
Color/Quine: colors are more vague than rabbits. In order to determine whether someone is a bachelor you need additional information. The stimulus meaning is not decisive here. There is a rising line from stimulus meaning to additional information: colors - rabbit - bachelor. ((s)> Knowledge/Quine
).
I 386
Disposition Terms/Quine: are assumptions from fine structure (microstructure). The color: "red" is actually also a disposition term. Irreducible general terms are only paraphrasable through subjunctive conditionals (counterfactual conditionals).
>Counterfactual Conditionals/Quine.
II 120 ff
Colors/Smart: color differences are rarely associated with significant physical differences. Aliens probably have concepts for length and electric charge, but not for color. To see the world correctly we must avoid colors and secondary qualities.
V 104
Color/Quine: is not a concept: because it is nothing definite like square and not a particular color. Instead there is the concept of a color word - i.e. "'Red' is a color word" (is language-specific). A bad way to phrase it is: "Red is a color". Because, for example, red and blue are as different as people whose phone number is a prime number. ((s) There is no designating property here. What are red and blue to have in common?) Ostension: Problem: Color is everywhere - therefore "There is color" is a bad observation sentence.
Color similarity: always refers to exact similarity.
Color Word/Color/General Term/Singular Term/Reference/Language Learning/Language Acquisition/Quine: E.g. you can call snow white and blood red without "white" and "red" being general terms. Snow is a diffuse part of the world which is part of a comprehensive diffuse part of the world, the White. Similar: Example a) smiling mom, b) mom in general. N.B.: against: E.g. the fact that Fido is a dog does not lead to it being part of that broader part of the world which consists of dogs, because that would also apply to his ear. - (>Gavagai) - accordingly for square.

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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987


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