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Essentialism: the view that objects have some of their properties necessarily. See also essence, necessity de re, necessity, contingency, properties, actualism, possible worlds.
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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

W.V.O. Quine on Essentialism - Dictionary of Arguments

Lauener XI 58
QuineVsEssentialism/Quantification/Lauener: quantification takes no account of the terminology - e.g. Fx is true if there is an object that satisfies that, no matter how it is called - e.g. 9 is the successor of 8 whether it is the number of planets or not.
>Quantification/Quine
.
Lauener XI 175
Essentialism/singular term/general term/modal logic/Follesdal/Lauener: a semantics of modalities must distinguish between singular terms on the one hand and general terms and sentences on the other: i.e. between expressions that have a reference ((s) reference object) and expressions that have an extension ((s) a specifiable set).
>Singular Terms/Quine, >General Terms/Quine.
Quantification into opaque contexts/solution/FollesdalVsQuine: to be able to quantify into opaque contexts, we then have to make these contexts referentially transparent and at the same time extensionally opaque.
Essentialism: that is what essentialism means:
Def referential transparency/Follesdal/Lauener: what is true about an object applies to it, no matter how we refer to it.
Def extensional opacity/Follesdal/Lauener: among the predicates true of an object, some apply necessarily and others accidentally.
Quine VII (b) 21
QuineVsEssentialism: what is considered essential is arbitrary: a rational biped must be bipedal (because of its feet), but it does not have to be rational. The latter is relative.
VII (h) 151ff
QuineVsModal Logic: The modal logic makes essentialism necessary, i.e. one cannot do without necessary features of the objects themselves, because one cannot do without quantification. Actually, there is nothing necessary about the objects "themselves", but only in the way of reference.
VII (h) 156
Barcan formula: You have to accept an Aristotelian essentialism if you want to allow quantified modal logic. ((s) Therefore, Kripke calls himself an essentialist.) > Barcan formula.

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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Q XI
H. Lauener
Willard Van Orman Quine München 1982


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