Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
| |||
|
| |||
| Bivalence: the division in the evaluation of statements on two possible values. These can be interpreted as "true" and "false", but also can be interpreted differently. In multivalued logic there are three to infinitely many values. See also probabilities._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
| Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|
|
W.V.O. Quine on Bivalence - Dictionary of Arguments
II 48 Bivalence/Dummett: according to Dummett, bivalence is the hallmark of realism. Quine: I do not care much about bivalence, mainly it is good for simplification. In addition to the undecidable facts of the realists with regard to physical objects, the vagueness of the terms must be taken into account. Here, too, there are problems due to bivalence: Sorites: Example, if a heap always remains after removal of a single grain from a sand heap, it follows by means of complete induction that a heap remains after removal of all grains. Bivalence seals the paradox, since it demands that in every phase the heap must be either true or false. Solution: the paradox is generally brought about by vague terms. >Paradoxes/Quine. II 50 Thinking as if our terms were precise does not seem to be further complicated as long as we see that they can be clarified by arbitrary definitions. II 52 Bivalence: Bivalence is nevertheless a fundamental feature of our scientific world. This is not a problem in the liberal sense. Frege: every general term applies or not. All terms are vague by ostension. It is not a matter of convention, nor of inscrutable but objective facts. Nevertheless, we cannot avoid seeing the table as one and not another. That is how it is with bivalence. II 53 Bivalence is a basic feature of our classical scientific theories. True/False Dichotomy. In accordance with our scientific theories, we consider all such propositions as if they had a factual content. And even if it is so far from observation. This is in the interests of simplicity. II 54 The concept of the physical object in the liberal sense does not entail any embarrassment, since it understands all candidates indiscriminately as a "table". X 115 Trivalent logic: cancels the classic bivalence. Negation/multi-valued logic/Quine: could we defend it so that we define it to be true exactly when the negated sentence is not true? Vs: this leads to the desired meaning, but is based on a circle: we use the classic "not", which the dissenter rejects. X 115 Bivalence/multi-valued logic/Quine: doubts about bivalence are often weakly justified. 1. Vs Sentence of the excluded middle/VsSaD: worst justification: that there are always intermediate stages. 2. Vs Sentence of the excluded middle: otherwise there would be a confusion of knowledge and truth. >Excluded Middle/Quine. X 116 Quine pro extreme realism: we can take the view that each of the sentences of which we do not know the answer is either true or false. 3. Vs Sentence of the excluded middle: to take it more seriously: justification from the antinomies of set theory and semantics: Russell's Antinomy/Bovcar: (1939): middle truth value for "~(x ε x)". QuineVs: this violates the "principle of minimal mutilation": the antinomies come from set theory and semantics, let us try to solve them there, and not paralyse the functioning of complete logic. 4. Quantum Mechanics Vs Sentence of the excluded middle: is an uncertainty relation. Certain quantities cannot be measured simultaneously. Thus it seems superfluous and misleading to maintain the classical logical apparatus. Birkhoff/v.Neumann: (1936): weakened replacement for the truth-functional logic; it is not a multi-valued logic but not a truth function. PopperVs: that does not do what it is supposed to do._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
||
