Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Universal quantification: an operator, which indicates that the following expression is a statement about all the objects in the considered domain. Notation "(x)" or "∀x". Ex. E.g. (x) (Fx ∧ Gx) everyday language "All Fs are Gs." .- Antonym_____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Hartry Field on Universal Quantification - Dictionary of Arguments
II 348 Everything/absolutely everything/Universal Quantification/Truth-Theory/Field: the object-language quantifiers of a truth-theory cannot go over everything. ((s) Otherwise the theory becomes circular). >Domains, >Paradoxes, >Circular reasoning. II 353 Universal Quantification/indeterminacy/McGee/Field: McGee: we must exclude the hypothesis that a person's apparently unrestricted quantifiers only go over entities of the type F if the person has a concept of F. This excludes the normal attempts to show the indeterminacy of universal quantification. FieldVsMcGee: that does not work. Question: do our own quantifiers have any particular area? >Quantifiers, >Scope. It is not clear what it means to have the concept of a restricted area, because if universal quantification is indeterminate, then so are the terms that are used to restrict the area. >Indeterminacy._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994 |
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> Counter arguments against Field
> Counter arguments in relation to Universal Quantification
