Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Actualism: in relation to worlds the thesis that only our own world is real. - Counter-position essentialism._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Robert Stalnaker on Actualism - Dictionary of Arguments
I 12 Actualism/Stalnaker: the actualism does not take possible worlds literally as worlds but as ways of how the world might have been. N.B.: contingent identity is not allowed but probably contingent dissimilarity. ((s) According to Kripke, identity is always necessary identity insofar as descriptions are not involved, but names are). >Identity/Kripke, >Rigidity, >Descriptions. I 120 Actualism/Stalnaker: actualism is not a restrictive metaphysical theory as materialism or nominalism - it is just a trivial consequence of the meaning of "actual". >Materialism, >Nominalism. I 128 Presentism/Stalnaker: presentism is analogous to actualism regarding worlds: thesis: we are extended in time just as we are spread over possible worlds. >Presentism. Then we can have real temporal identity. (Stalnaker pro). Fusion/fission/personal identity: cases of fusion and fission are then cases where persons who were separated earlier become identical or a person is divided into two. >Personal identity, >Fusion, >Split._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
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