|Gaus I 108
Values/liberalism/Gaus: The idea that, somehow, liberalism could be intimately associated with scepticism about values, or some form of subjectivism, is controversial today: many important liberals such as Sher (1997)(1) dispute it.
Antiliberalism: Moreover, opponents of liberalism such as Alasdair MacIntyre (1981)(2) have sought to make just this link, making contemporary defenders of liberalism suspicious about accepting some sort of tie.
Skepticism: Nevertheless, scepticism about the interpersonal status of values has long been a part of liberalism.The sceptical camp includes all those liberalisms premised on the supposition that the powers of human reason are insufficient to provide public, definitive answers to the enduring questions concerning what makes life worth living, and to what ends we should devote ourselves. This line of liberal thinking can trace itself back to Hobbes and Locke(3).
1. Sher, George (1997) Beyond Neutrality: Perfectionism and Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
2. MacIntyre, Alasdair (1981) After Virtue. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
3. Locke, John (1975) An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Peter H. Nidditch. Oxford: Clarendon. p. 299
Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „The Diversity of Comprehensive Liberalisms.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Gerald F. Gaus
Handbook of Political Theory London 2004