Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Pluralism: Pluralism is the view that society is composed of a variety of competing groups and interests, and that no single group or ideology should have dominant influence. Pluralists believe that diversity is a strength, and that it leads to better decision-making and social outcomes. See also Society, Community._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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John Rawls on Pluralism - Dictionary of Arguments
Gaus I 240 Pluralism/diversity/Rawls/D’Agostino: [in relation to diversity] there are, (...) a variety of pluralisms, of stances towards and arguments about the purported political relevance of diversity. We might believe, for instance, that, 'in the limit' , diversity of evaluations would be eliminated by the progressive correction of epistemic and/or motivational deficiencies, much as monism presupposes. We might nevertheless also believe that, given human finitude (Chemiak, 1986)(1), such a 'limit' is unapproachable (to any very great degree) without forms of corrective action that would themselves be manifestly indefensible, ethico-politically, and, hence, that it cannot be demanded, as monism does demand, that we actually aim at the elimination of such diversity. Rawls: This seems to have been John Rawls's view in the book Political Liberalism and he grounds such weak pluralism, as I will call it, in his analysis of the so-called 'burdens of judgment' (1993(2): ch. II, s. 2). These are, specifically, those 'hazards involved in the correct (and conscientious) Gaus I 241 exercise of our powers of reason and judgement in the ordinary course of political life' , which make it improbable that 'conscientious persons with full powers of reason, even after free discussion, will all arrive at the same conclusion' (1993(2): 56, 58). Rawls himself characterizes this doctrine in terms of 'the practical impossibility of reaching reason- able and workable political agreement' (1993(2): 63), and says that it expresses 'a political conception [that] tries to avoid, so far as possible, disputed philosophical theses and to give an account that rests on plain facts open to all' (1993(2): 57, n. 10). >Pluralism/Political Philosophy. ((s) This is a weak version of pluralism; for the distinction of strong and weak pluralism see >Pluralism/D’Agostino. 1) Rawls points out that '[e]ven where we fully agree about the kinds of considerations that are relevant [to assessment and choice], we may disagree about their weight, and so arrive at different Lover- allJ judgments' (1993(2): 56). Rawls himself of course treats this phenomenon in purely 'practical' terms: reduction of such diversity would require the deployment of morally impermissible tactics. D’AgostinoVsRawls: Some observations of Thomas Kuhn (1977(3): 330ff) provide the basis, however, for an argument in favour of precisely this kind of diversity. 2) Rawls points out that 'all our [choice-relevant] concepts are vague and subject to hard cases and that this indeterminacy means that we must rely on judgement and interpretation... where reasonable persons may differ' (1993(2): 56). Example: This might mean, schematically, that A considers X superior to Y whereas B does not because he, A, does judge that some choice-relevant concept (e.g. 'is just') applies to X whereas, because of indeterminacy or vagueness, she, B, does not. (A and B agree about 'core cases' for the application of the term but disagree about 'peripheral cases', which may, of course, still be important, ethico-politically.) Cf. >Diversity/Hart. Gaus I 242 3) Rawls notes, finally, that 'any system of social institutions is limited in the values it can admit so that some selection must be made from the full range of moral and political values that might be realized' (1993(2): 57). Individuals/diversity/Ralws/D’Agostino: In Rawls's terminology, diversity in individuals' evaluations 'rests on plain facts open to all'. And, indeed, there may even, as Rawls himself believes, be versions of the diversity-endorsing doctrine of pluralism which manage to avoid 'disputed philosophical theses'. But there are also versions of pluralism which are more robust philosophically (than Rawls's weak pluralism), and which are argued for on quite different bases. >Pluralism/Berlin, >Diversity/Hart. 1. Cherniak, Christopher (1986) Minimal Rationality. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 2. Rawls, John (1993) Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. 3. Kuhn, Thomas (1977) The Essential Tension. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. D’Agostino, Fred 2004. „Pluralism and Liberalism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
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