Mause I 413
Environmental Policy/New Political Economy/Public Choice: since the New Political Economy assumes that the respectiv">
|Mause I 413
Environmental Policy/New Political Economy/Public Choice: since the New Political Economy assumes that the respective (short-term) chances of re-election constitute a central restriction to action for politicians, well-informed and influential political actors or groups in environmental policy - contrary to the common good - can shape or even block the choice of environmental policy strategies according to their specific preferences (Döring and Pahl 2003, S. 94) (1), as was already fundamentally explained by Olson (1965) (2) in his reflections on the "logic of collective action".
The particular interests of relatively small and financially well-funded interest groups will therefore have a greater chance of asserting themselves.
Problem: heterogeneous groups such as taxpayers, consumers and environmental activists are thus subject to asymmetry in terms of influence. See also State/Public Choice.
1. Thomas Döring & Thilo Pahl. Kooperative Lösungen in der Umweltpolitik – eine ökonomische Sicht. In Kooperative Umweltpolitik, Hrsg. Bernd Hansjürgens, Wolfgang Köck und Georg Kneer, 89– 112. Baden-Baden 2003.
2. Mancur Olson, The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups. Cambridge 1965._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018