|Mause I 271
Def Arrow theorem: it is impossible to democratically derive from the unrestricted preferences of individuals a consistent social welfare function that cannot be manipulated by adding irrelevant alternatives and fulfils the Pareto criterion. (1) ArrowVsNeoclassical theories, See Welfare Economics/Neoclassical Economics.
Problems: See Benefit/Mueller, Dennis C.
1.Kenneth J. Arrow, Social choice and individual values. New Haven 1951._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Kenneth J. Arrow
Social Choice and Individual Values: Third Edition New Haven 2012
Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018