|Mause I 230f
Interventions/New Political Economy/Public Choice: The danger of dynamic inconsistency is particularly emphasized by the New Political Economy.
Problems: lack of credibility, time inconsistency ((s) delay or lack of effects). (1)
For example, inadequate expectation formation and anticipation can be used temporarily in the markets to achieve the employment target.
Problem: Lack of credibility: e.g. The announcements of the central bank are no longer considered credible and market participants take higher inflation rates into account in their economic plans.
Solution/New Political Economy: institutional framework conditions that change the central bank's decision-making calculations. Accordingly, either the room for manoeuvre of monetary policy makers must be limited by means of rules and legal requirements or the costs of inflation must (...) be increased.
Post-KeynesianismVsNew Political Economy: Rather, the danger is seen here that discretionary ((s) selective) monetary and fiscal policies will remain too passive and therefore the output level will remain below the production potential for unnecessarily long for political reasons, combined with cyclical unemployment. (2)
John B. TalyorVsBarro: See Taylor Rule/Taylor.
1. Barro, Robert J., und David B. Gordon, Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy. Journal of Monetary Economics 12, (1), 1983. S. 101– 121.
2.Vgl. Michal Kalecki, In Collected works of Michal Kalecki, Hrsg. Jerzy Osyatinski. Oxford 1973._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
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