|Brocker I 485
Organisation/Olson: If organisations have selective incentives, they develop a robustness and stability that enables them to survive. An organisation could not offer potential members an incentive to become members if it serves no other purpose than to provide a public good (see Social Goods/Olson): "Only an organisation that also sells private or non-collective goods or provides individual members with beneficial social or recreational facilities would have such positive incentives" (1). However, privileged and medium-sized groups may succeed in representing their interests without selective incentives. In smaller groups, social goods such as praise and reprimand have a stronger impact.
Brocker I 486
Problem: large groups are always in danger of being exploited by smaller groups: For example, agricultural migrant workers, employees, taxpayers, consumers: these groups usually have no organization "that could oppose the power of organized or monopolistic producers". (2)
1. Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Cambridge, Mass. 1965. Dt.: Mancur Olson, Die Logik des kollektiven Handelns: Kollektivgüter und die Theorie der Gruppen, Tübingen 1998 (zuerst 1968)., S. 131
2. Ebenda S. 163
Johannes Marx, „Mancur Olson, Die Logik des kollektiven Handelns“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups Cambridge 1965
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018