|Surowiecki I 333
Public Choice Theory/Politics/Economic Sciences/Buchanan: Thesis: the tendency is to suppress long-term problems in favour of short-term political interests. In reality, many regulations tend to serve regulated companies. (1)
Surowiecki I 334
SurowieckiVsBuchananan: the assumption that principles and public interest have no place in politics overlooks the fact that voters themselves did not think of broader goals and that interest groups exercise an almost complete control (...).
James M. Buchanan/Gordon Tullock: Thesis: The average individual acts on the basis of the same overall value framework when he/she participates in the (...) market and is politically active. (2)
1. The Nobel prize lecture by James Buchanan (1986) offers an interesting view of the philosophical and conceptual foundations of "public-choice" theory, which Buchanan has described elsewhere as "politics without romanticism": http://www.nobel.se/economics/laureates/1986/buchanan-lecture.html.
2. Mark Kelman, »On Democracy-Bashing – A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical and ›Empirical‹ Practice of the Public Choice Movement«, Virginia Law Review 74/1988, S. 235, 252._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
James M. Buchanan
Politics as Public Choice Carmel, IN 2000
Die Weisheit der Vielen: Warum Gruppen klüger sind als Einzelne und wie wir das kollektive Wissen für unser wirtschaftliches, soziales und politisches Handeln nutzen können München 2005