|Information, information theory: A character or a character combination contains information when it is clear to the recipient that this character or the character combination appears instead of another possible character or a possible character combination. The supply of possible characters determines to a part the probability of the occurrence of a character from this supply. In addition, the expected probability of the appearance of a character can be increased by already experienced experiences of regularities. The amount of information transmitted by a character depends on the improbability of the occurrence of the character._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Information/Markets/Sunstein: prediction markets are extraordinarily good at bringing information together. Examples of this are predictions about who will win the next Oscar or which products will be successful. In such prediction markets, people can "invest" and bet on the probability of an event occurring. (See Google/Sunstein). At the same time, there is a lot of knowledge in the game that becomes evident in this way.
Information/Group discussions/Communication/Democracy: the term "hidden profiles" has emerged (3) for the phenomenon that individual members who have information that the majority of their group (e. g. bodies) lacks, keep to themselves. There are things the group could have, but they do not have them. Hidden Profiles are an effect of what is called Common Knowledge.
Common Knowledge/Sunstein: is information available to all members of a group as opposed to information that only some members have. (1)
Statistically, this can be explained simply by the fact that it is more likely that common knowledge will be communicated in the group. However, social effects also play a role. (...) Information that only individual members possess must be communicated at the very beginning, otherwise the jointly shared information prevails.
As a result, group decisions ultimately reflect the initial attitudes of some members, even if - withheld - deviating information would have led to a different outcome. (2), (3)
Information Cascades/Sunstein: the main feature of such a cascade is that the parties involved do not reveal the information they possess.
As a result, those involved can make a whole series of serious mistakes.
Members who join later withhold information because they are instructed by those who were there before them. The New England Journal of Medicine investigated imitation effects in doctors who behaved "like lemmings". (4)
1. Daniel Gigone and Reid Hastie, “The Common Knowledge Effect: Information Sharing and Group Judgments,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 65 (1993): 971–73 (explaining hidden profiles by reference to common knowledge effect).
2. See Garold Stasser and William Titus, “Pooling of Unshared Information in Group Decision Making: Biased Information Sampling During Discussion,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 48 (1985): p. 1476
3. Stasser and Titus, “Hidden Profiles,” 305.
4. David Hirshleifer, “The Blind Leading the Blind: Social Influence, Fads, and Informational Cascades,” in The New Economics of Human Behavior, ed. Mariano Tommasi and Kathryn Ierulli (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 193–95, and on the discussion in Cass R. Sunstein, Why Societies Need Dissent (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), p. 204._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Cass R. Sunstein
Infotopia: How Many Minds Produce Knowledge Oxford 2008
Cass R. Sunstein
#Republic: Divided Democracy in the Age of Social Media Princeton 2017