Equilibrium/Rawls: I use the term intuitively. See W. R. Ashby, Design for a Brain, 2nd. Ed. (London, 1960), chs. 2-4,19-29.
The term stability, which I use for this purpose, is actually one of the quasi-stability: when an equilibrium is stable, all variables return to their equilibrium after a disturbance. In terms of quasi stability, there are only a few. See Harvey Leibenstein, Economic Backwardness and Economic Growth, (New York, 1957), p, 18.
Quasi-stable society: is a well-ordered society that is quasi-stable in terms of its institutions and the sense of justice of its citizens. If, for example, certain circumstances mean that institutions can no longer be regarded as fair, they should be able to be reformed as the situation requires, and justice has been restored.
Three conditions must be fulfilled for a society in an equilibrium:
1. The system is to be identified and internal and external forces must be distinguishable.
2. Different states of the system and their characteristic features are to be identified.
3. The laws linking the different states shall be specified.
Depending on their nature, some systems do not have a state of equilibrium, others have many.
Sense of justice: the sense of justice of citizens in a society plays a decisive role.
Moral learning/tradition: we can distinguish between two main currents: 1) One originates from Hume to Sidgwick and can be found today in social learning theories. Thesis: missing social motives are gained through learning.
A variant of this thesis assumes that moral standards are acquired before any understanding.
2) The second traditional thesis comes from Rousseau and Kant, it is rationalistic and is sometimes represented by J. St. Mill and, more recently, by J. Piaget: Moral learning is therefore not so much a question of filling gaps as a free development of our innate and intellectual abilities after natural disposition.
See J.-J. Rousseau, Emile (London, 1908) es. pp 46-66 (in bk. II), 172-196 (in bk. IV); I. Kant The Critique of Practical Reason, pt. II, The Methodology of Pure Practical Reason; J. Piaget, The Moral Judgment oft he Child (London, 1932); Lawrence Kohlberg, „The Development of Moral Thought“, Vita Humana, vol. 6 (1963); VsPiaget: M. L. Hoffman, „Moral Development“ (1970) pp.264-275; VsKohlberg: pp. 276-281.)_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005