|Principles, philosophy of science: physical principles are not the same as laws of nature. Rather, laws can be gained from principles or traced back to principles. Examples are the principle of the shortest time, the principle of the smallest effect, the uncertainty principle. See also theories, laws of nature, laws, natural constants._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Ronald Dworkin on Principles - Dictionary of Arguments
Brocker I 596
Principles/Dworkin: Rules are either valid or not valid - however, principles can collide without at least one of them having to be invalid.
Principles/Dworkin: have a certain weight and indicate in which direction arguments point. (1)
Moral content comes into law in the form of principles. (2) Morally meaningful constitutional concepts such as "equality" or "human dignity", however, are general and substantially controversial. We do not have unanimously accepted criteria for their correct or incorrect use.
Brocker I 599/600
DworkinVsHart: while Hart insists on the conventional nature of law (see Law/Hart), Dworkin refers to principles. See Legal Positivism/Dworkin.
HartVsDworkin: see Law/Hart.
Brocker I 601
Principles/Dworkin: For Dworkin there is a close connection between principles and rights: The valid claims of individuals emerge from principles (3). They limit the possibility for the state to violate individual interests in the name of collective objectives. While collective objectives are aggregative, rights are distributive: They protect individuals with regard to fundamental and central interests.
Brocker I 595
Utilitarianism/Principles/DworkinVsUtilitarianism/Dworkin: Arguments of principles express the moral claims to validity that play a role in law. From them
Brocker I 596
individual rights emerge that outdo collective goals in conflict situations; this thesis points to Dworkin's normative confrontation with utilitarianism. (4)
1. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, Cambridge, Mass. 1977 (erw. Ausgabe 1978). Dt.: Ronald Dworkin, Bürgerrechte ernstgenommen, Frankfurt/M. 1990, S. 58-64
2. Ibid. p. 304
3. Ibid. p. 146
4. Ibid. p. 56f.
Bernd Ladwig, „Ronald Dworkin, Bürgerrechte ernstgenommen“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Taking Rights Seriously Cambridge, MA 1978
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018