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Definition Actuality/Existence/Being/Frege/Russell/Quine/Boer: Thesis: There is no distinction between existence and being. (> Non-existence, non-existencing). That is, there are no non-existent things.
Nominalism is, of course, an actualism.
Tolerant actualism/Boer: admits, e.g. that there are non-actual states. E.g. causally not effective non-concreted individuals. For example, non-exemplified properties.
Intentional relation/tolerant actualism: allows that it is only possible that we participate in such relations. Principle (DI):
(DI) Definition "X participates/participation in the world": If X is an individual, then it exists localized in the space time, if X is a proposition, it exists and is true. If X is a state, it exists and persists. If X is a property or relation, then it exists and is exemplified. If X is an event, then it exists and X occurs.
Non-actuality/Boer: would say that non-existent things can no longer participate in the world, as unexamplified properties.
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Therefore (DI) can be accepted by actualists as well as by non-actualists.
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Scientific Camp: Plantinga: (1974)
(1) is a liberal actualist without nominalist scruples - also allows properties, relation and propositions.
1. Plantinga, Alvin: 1974, The Nature of Necessity, Clarendon, Oxford.
2. Boër, Steven E., and William G. Lycan. “Who, Me?” The Philosophical Review, vol. 89, no. 3, 1980, pp. 427–466. (JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/2184397. Accessed 7 Feb. 2021.)
