I 267
Cause/Bigelow/Pargetter: Thesis: a cause is neither sufficient nor necessary for an effect.
Reason: there is a backup system that could have produced the same effect.
I 268
If the updated system failed. E.g. you could have also eaten another slice of bread. Different food intake can have exactly the same effect.
Blur/Imperfection/Bigelow/Pargetter: it is a characteristic feature of living systems. Nevertheless, this is not an intrinsic feature.
>
Effect, >
Causation, >
Causality, cf. >
Anomalous monism.
Cause/Lewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: Lewis allows that a cause is not a necessary condition for the effect. Nevertheless, he explains causation by necessity. Namely, through chains of necessary conditions. (1973b
(1), 1986d
(2), 1979
(3)).
>
Necessity, >
Conditions, >
Sufficiency.
Cause/Mackie/Bigelow/Pargetter: he arrives at similar results like Lewis, but with strict conditionals.
>
Cause/Mackie.
Cause/INUS/Mackie: (Mackie 1965)
(4) Thesis: not a sufficient but necessary part of an unnecessary but sufficient condition.
Cause/Lewis/Mackie/Bigelow/Pargetter: both come from a chain of necessary conditions. They differ in how the links of the chain are to be connected.
Lewis: through counterfactual conditioning
Mackie: through strict conditionals. Their antecedents can be so complex that we cannot specify them in practice.
Backup system/Bigelow/Pargetter: (see above) would cause a counterfactual conditional to fail. Nevertheless, Lewis records the cause as a cause because it contributes to the chain.
Mackie: dito, because the deviant cause is part of a sufficient condition.
BigelowVsLewis/BigelowVsMackie: both theories have disadvantages.
>
Counterfactual conditional.
1.Lewis, D.K. (1973). Causation. Journal of Philosophy 70. pp.556-67.
2. Lewis, D.K. (1986d). Philosophical Papers, Vol. II, New York: Oxford University Press.
3. Lewis, D. K. (1979). Counterfactual dependence and time's arrow, Nous 13 pp.455-76.
4. Mackie, J. L. (1965). Causes and Conditions. American Philosophical Quarterly 2, pp.245-255.
