Lexicon of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]


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Theses I
Theses II

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Bubner I 75
Dialectic/Plato/Hegel/Bubner: true dialectic is not a matter of controversy of different, changing aspects, but a necessary movement inside the grasping of reality.
Irony/Socrates/Hegel/Bubner: the Socratic method makes everyone think for themselves and thus creates a distance to the given immediacy, which is not based on arbitrary intervention.
It allows for the withdrawal of the subjective positioning. Room is made for the things themselves. The dogmatism of one-sided aspects destroys itself. Thus the dialectic admits everything and allows inner destruction to develop by it.
I 76
Irony/Friedrich Schlegel: is thus the highest mode of behavior of the mind.
>Irony.
Bubner: Dialectic as the "irony of the world" is then the counterpart to the self-importance of the modern ego with its all-decomposing reflection.
>Reflection.
I 77
HegelVsPlaton: stopped halfway. He moved undecided between the subjective and the objective dialectics, i.e. the supple reflection, of which we are all capable, and the inevitability in presenting a connection of intolerance.
 This is a translation task (from the subjective into the objective dialectic) which can be achieved with Socratic irony.
"General irony of the world".
>Causality, >Hermeneutics, >Teleology.
---
Wright I 21
Dialectic/Hegel/Marx/Wright, G. H.: the dialectic scheme of development through thesis, antithesis and synthesis is not a causalist thought pattern. The Hegelian and Marxist concepts of law and development come closer to what we would call patterns of conceptual or logical connections.
Wright I 154
G. H. von WrightVsMarx: Marx shows a clear ambivalence between a "causalist", "scientistic" and on the other hand a "hermeneutical-dialectic", "teleological" orientation. This ambivalence gives rise to radically different interpretations of his philosophical statements.
- - -
Gadamer I 471
Dialectic/Hegel/Gadamer: The speculative relationship must (...) change into dialectical representation. According to Hegel, this is the demand of philosophy.
>Speculation/Hegel, >Predication/Hegel.
What means expression and representation here is of course not actually a proving action, but the thing
Gadamer I 472
proves itself by expressing and representing itself in this way. Thus dialectic will also really experience that thinking is turned into its opposite as an incomprehensible inversion.
Expression: Dialectic is the expression of the speculative, the representation of what actually lies in the speculative, and insofar the "real" >speculative.
Proof: But if (...) the representation is not an additional action, but the emergence of the thing itself, then the philosophical proof itself belongs to the thing.
Representation: (...) nevertheless, such representation is not at all external in truth.
It only considers itself to be so as long as thinking does not know that in the end it proves itself to be a >reflection of the thing within itself. It is true that Hegel emphasizes the difference between speculative and dialectical only in the preface to phenomenology. Because this difference cancels itself out, Hegel later, from the point of view of absolute >knowledge, no longer records it.
>Speculation/Hegel, >Thinking/Hegel.

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