I 284
Purpose-means-thinking/language/animal/Papineau: (also as "Spandrille", side effect): Thesis: supposedly purpose-means-thinking emerged in a piggyback manner with language in the evolution.
>
Evolution, >
Purposes, >
Animals, >
Animal language, >
Thinking, >
World/Thinking.
PapineauVs: there is a danger of circularity: the primary biological purpose of language could be to increase the supply of information, but this would not help if the purpose-means-thinking had not already been developed.
>Circular reasoning.
Papineau: language could also have developed first as an instrument for passing on information. E.g. "A tiger approaches".
>
Information.
I 285
Problem/Papineau: to explain the last step: what is the additional biological pressure that led to the language with which general information are reported?
>
Selection.
A) If for the purpose of facilitating the purpose-means-thinking, then the purpose-means-thinking is not a side effect. It might have been language-dependent.
B) If, on the other hand, language developed the ability to represent and process general information on an independent basis, there are further problems:
1. Why should language be selected for reporting and processing at all?
2. Fundamental: If language is independent of the purpose-means-thinking, then we need a story about how this independent ability is subsequently expanded as a side effect for the purpose-means-thinking.
Cf. >
Epiphenomenalism.
The point is that the purpose-means-thinking must exercise a behavioral control.
>
Behavior, >
Control mechanism, >
Behavioral control, cf. >
Self-regulation.
I 286
The ability for general information processing must be able to add something to the set of dispositions: E.g.: "From now on only fish instead of meat", E.g. "At the next mailbox I will post the letter".
Without this, the purpose-means-thinking makes no difference for our actions.
>
Information processing, cf. >
Problem solving.
I 286
Language/Purpose-Means-Thinking/Evolution/Papineau: Problem: how could a new way to change our behavior arise without a fundamental biological change? As a side effect? This is a pointless assumption. It must have brought the ability to develop new dispositions.
>
Evolution, >
Dispositions.
It is hard to imagine how this should have happened without biological selection.
I 287
But this is not yet an argument for a wholly separate mechanism for the purpose-means-thinking in the human brain.
Weaker: there could be some biological mechanism for the purpose-means-thinking, e.g. that the language has developed independently of the processing and reporting. Thereafter, further steps allow their outputs to influence the behavior.
Cf. >
Strength of theories, >
Stronger/weaker.
I 290
Language/Evolution/Generality/Papineau: previously I distinguished the language for special facts from one for general facts.
>
Generality/Papineau, >
Generalization.
Perhaps the former has developed for communication, and the latter for the purpose-means-thinking.
>
Communication.
Or language for general facts has evolved under the co-evolutionary pressure of purpose-means-thinking and communication.
Presentation/figurative/Papineau: how could the results of the figurative representation gain the power to influence the already existing structures of the control of the action?
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Imagination, >
Thinking without language.
I 291
Perhaps from imitation of complex action sequences of others.
>
Imitation.
