Lexicon of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]


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Metzinger I 264
Color Researcher Mary/Terminology/Nida-Rümelin(1): non-phenomenally believe: from the use of language - e.g. the sky is blue - in that, you can believe yourself that it is about "red" - believe phenomenally: "The same color as this" or also "knowing how".
>Color researcher Mary, >Knowledge how, >Phenomena, >Qualia.
Metzinger I 273
But she does not acquire new knowledge simply by getting to know colors from her own experience.
>Knowledge, >Propositional knowledge.
Color Perception/Color Words/Colors/Mary/Marianna/Nida RümelinVsJackson: we better assume two stages: 1) she finally sees colors in the house - only now can she ask if the sky looks redp, bluep, greenp or yellowp for people with normal vision - before: she could not consider the alternatives - but still no acquisition of knowledge.
2nd stage: she steps outside and sees that the sky is blue - so she knows which alternative is true - thus, her own de-se belief that the sky is redp is disproved - therefore, she corrects her mistake about the meaning of color words.
>Color words.

1. Martine Nida-Rümelin: Was Mary nicht wusste in Th. Metzinger (Hg.) Bewusstsein Paderborn, München 1995

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