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Rationality/Bennett/Millikan: it seems as if he should not choose "abbreviations" as a rational human. That is, one must take into account not only positive evidence, but also negative ones.
General/formal: e.g. assuming, John believes
"Usual": if A then B and also:
"Not-(usual: if A-and-not-C, then B)"
Rational: would then follow that John would have to believe
A) "usual: if A then C" and
B) if A and C, then B. Then there are the following possible cases.
1. The only evidence for C comes from that John knows that usually, if A then C. Then he should simply pass from A to B.
2. John has independent ways to believe C due to evidence. And he encounters A, while he already has evidence for not-C.
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Then, rationally, he should also believe that not-C and not conclude from A to B.
3. John has independent evidence according to which he could know C, but this time he does not know beforehand whether C.
Question: then, in order to be rational, must he first check whether C?
Millikan: Let's suppose he needs to do it.
Problem: if this again depends solely on the fact that he believes:
"Usually if D, then C", etc.
Rationality/Millikan: Problem: The more knowledge one acquires, the more he has to strive to be rational at all. Would it not be better for him to refrain from the whole checking process?
>
Verification, >
Confirmation, >
Knowledge/Millikan.
