Lexicon of Arguments

 

I 269
Epistemology/Leibniz/Aristotle/Millikan: the dispute between Leibniz and Aristotle reappears at the level of epistemology:
I 270
For example, the assertion "x is red" is equivalent to the assertion "x looks red for a standard observer under standard conditions.
Problem: then follows from "x is not red": "x does not look red for .. under ...".
Ontology: this corresponds to the fact that non-red would be a void, an absence of red - rather than an opposite of red.
However, it is about that "x is not red" is equivalent to "x does not look red under standard ..." is either empty or false.
>Appearance, >Apearance/Leibniz, >Perception/Aristotle, >Knowledge, >Predication.