Lexicon of Arguments

 Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]


Complaints - Corrections

Table
Concepts
Versus
Sc. Camps
Theses I
Theses II

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Cavell I 45
Pain/Numerical Identity/Qualitative Identity/Malcolm: Malcolm disputes the fact that one can reasonably say in (descriptive) identical painful occurrences that it is two.
>Pain, >Identification, >Individuation.
Thesis: with regard to sensory impressions, the concept of "numerical identity" has no application.
>Sensations, >Sensory impressions, >Perception.
Malcolm: if the description is the same, there cannot be the additional question whether the idea would also be the same.
>Description, >Concept, >Identity, >Equality, >Distinctions.
Cavell I 55
Identity/numeric/qualitative/Malcolm: in sensations, we must invent a criterion! E.g. Siamese twins with one hand: here you have to decide if there is one pain or two.
>Criteria, >Invention/Discovery, >Convention.

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