Holz I 48/49
Existence/world/outside/reason/Leibniz: a sufficient reason for existence cannot be found in the series of facts, but also not in the whole set-up.
Because also the composition, like the series needs a reason.
Leibniz calls the existence reason "extramundan" because it cannot be found within the series (series reum).
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Inside/outside/Leibniz,
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World/Leibniz.
Holz: that does not mean "outside the world"! Literally it means:
Leibniz: "apart from the world, there is a dominating one."
Not just like the soul in me but more like myself in my body, but of much higher reason.
Existence reason/outside/outer/Leibniz: The reason for unity is the form determinateness of its all-round connection, not the linearity of a sequence or series. To this extent the existence reason of the world (as the totality of the connections) is not in the world, but it conditions it as a world.
This "ultima ratio rerum" establishes the world and makes it". It is the connecting principle.
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Totality/Leibniz.
Holz I 70
Existence/Leibniz: of it we can have no idea, except through the perception of beings.
Therefore, perception is the formal unity and universality of all the contents that enter into it.
Holz I 71
"We have no other idea of existence than that we perceive that the things are perceived".
Perception/Leibniz: provides now, as self-perception, the idea of the continuity and contiguity of existence as such (which is evident to us in the existence of our own self).
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Perception/Leibniz, >
Experience/Leibniz.
Existence/Experience/Leibniz: Existence cannot be thought, it has to be experienced, because the sentence "non-being is" is contradictory. (However, only in relation to the whole).
Existence/Being/Leibniz: the falsification of the universal negation allows the tautology "the being is"! In contrast to any particular tautological statement like e.g. "The House is the House", which is only a concept or essence definition and does not include existence.
Only the universal proposition of being transcends from a logical definition into an ontological axiom.
Since it is related to the whole, there can be only one case of necessity of existence, namely that of the whole.
In the bodies themselves, there is no basis of existence, only in the total context, which ultimately includes the entire chain (all relationships in the universe).
In the individual bodies you will never find the reason why they are like that and not different.
Existence/Being/Leibniz: the falsification of the universal negation allows the tautology "the being is"! In contrast to any particular tautological statement like e.g. "The House is the House", which is only a concept or essence definition and does not include existence.
Only the universal proposition of being transcends from a logical definition into an ontological axiom.
Since it is related to the whole, there can only be one case of necessity of existence, namely that of the whole.
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Necessity/Leibniz.
In the bodies themselves, there is no reason of existence, only in the total context, which ultimately includes the entire chain (all relationships in the universe).
In the individual bodies you will never find the reason why they are like that and not different.
Holz I 72
Existence/Necessity/Identity/Being/Leibniz: the sentences
"The being is" and
"Only one being is necessary"
are in a very specific follow-up ratio:
The proposition "the being is" is an identical proposition, i.e. its opposite is contradictory.
Thus existential and copulative (copula) use of "is" coincide here.
One could also say "being is being" in order to make clear that the predicate is necessary for the subject. But:
For example, "the stone is a being stone": this sentence is not identical, the being does not necessarily belong to the stone! The stone could only be thought of. Therefore, we need the perception to be convinced of existence.
But this is not only true of bodies, but also of general, e.g. the genus human, it does not exist neccessarily.
Holz I 73
The necessity of existence is valid only by the world as a whole.
Holz I 75
Unity/Substance/LeibnizVsSpinoza: the ultimate ratio is necessarily only one reason, not a multiplicity, because it is the structure of the whole.
Leibniz, therefore, does not need to sacrifice the multiplicity of things in order to reach the one and only world. The substance of Spinoza is replaced by him with the "harmonie universelle".
Existence/Leibniz: Question: "Why is there anything at all and not rather nothing?".
This question also remains in existence when we have secured the unity of the multiplicity. There could still be nothing!
Holz I 76
Assuming that things must exist, one must also be able to specify the reason why they must exist in this way and not otherwise.
Holz I 91
Existence/Leibniz: "Why is there something and not rather nothing?"
1. The reason why something exists is in nature: the consequence of the supreme principle that nothing happens without reason.
2. The reason must lie in a real being or in a cause.
3. This being must be necessary, otherwise a further cause would have to be sought.
4. So there is a cause!
Holz I 92
5. This first cause also has the effect that everything possible has a striving for existence, since no universal reason for the restriction to only certain possible can be found.
6. Therefore it can be said that everything possible is intended for its future existence. (Because possibility is striving).
7. It does not follow from this that everything that is possible also exists. This would only follow if everything together were possible.
8. However, some possibilities are incompatible with others.
9. Thus arises the series of things that exists through the greatest range of all possibilities.
10. As fluids assume spherical form (largest content), there is in the nature of the universe a series with the greatest content.
11. Thus the most perfect exists, for perfection is nothing but the quantity of materiality. (Best of all worlds, >
best world).
12. Perfection, however, is not to be found solely in matter, but in form or variety.
Holz I 93
13. It follows from this that matter is not everywhere alike, but is made by the forms itself to be unequal.
(There are further 12 theses on the level of consciousness theory).
Holz I 120
World/Existenz/Leibniz: is as a whole contingent. There is no reason to see why this world must be. But we can see that it is a totality of all that is real and possible.
That is, the principle of deduction fails at the first substance, which can no longer be made intelligible, or is no longer derivable by itself.
Holz I 12
Question: Why is anything at all and not nothing?
Although we cannot see why this world is, we can still see that this world is possible! And many other possible beside it as well.
Then we can reformulate the question:
Why does this world exist and not another?
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Possible world/Leibniz, >
Possibility/Leibniz.
