Holz I 25
Unity/Leibniz: Leibniz emphasizes unity by saying that "something is not truly a being, which is not truly a being."
I 26
Holz: The plural presupposes the singular.
Unity/Monadology/Leibniz: there must be simple substances, because there are composite ones.
Problem: the simple, the unified, and the individual is not to be thought of in itself, for thinking it means determining, that is, delimitations against others, defining.
Plato/Parmenides: the one as one implies the other and is as one with respect to many.
Marsilius Ficino: Commentary on Parmenides: "The power of otherness itself, when inserted into the ideal forms, is the negation."
Being/Holz: when apart from all ontic differences, the Absolute Otherness is the logical bivalence, which corresponds ontologically to the mixing of the non-being with the being.
Leibniz: "non ens cum ente confusum".
I 43
Unity/experience/perception/world/Leibniz: The diversity of the world is as indisputable as it is unprovable.
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Proof/Leibniz, >
Provability/Leibniz, >
Perception/Leibniz, >
Experience/Leibniz.
The unity of this multiplicity must be gained from itself as a principle of demonstration.
Thinking: for the use of thought, the decline is enough for the first positing of the identity principle.
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Identity principle/Leibniz.
Recognition: for this the positing itself needs a reason.
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Kowledge/Leibniz.
I 58
Identity/multiplicity/manifoldness/substance/LeibnizVsSpinoza: the origin of the identity-evidence from experience leaves the multiplicity of the given unaffected. In contrast to Spinoza, where everything is reduced to the unity of a single substance.
The principle of identity is purely logical in Leibniz. But:
Epistemic/ontological/Leibniz: the ontological quality of the principle of identity is not found in itself, but in sense perception.
The senses show that "A is A" is a proposition whose opposition "A is not A" includes a formal contradiction.
The senses show that the predicate is inherent to the subject and that it is a contradiction to deny it to the predicate.
Holz: this is not an irrational empiricism: the system of the truths of reason which must be necessarily valid in this possible world must be given in the facticity of this world.
But the logical fact is always only given by reason in the way of deduction.
I 59
This is blocked from us directly and has to be deduced first.
In order that the pre-predicative evidence does not turn into the irrational, it must be justified in an ontological construct, in which identity proves to be the necessary structure of the manifold and changing world. (Reflection).
I 75
Unity/Substance/LeibnizVsSpinoza: the ultimate ratio is necessarily only one reason, not a multiplicity, because it is the structure of the whole.
Leibniz, therefore, needs not to sacrifice the multiplicity of things in order to reach the one and only world. The substance of Spinoza is replaced by his "universal harmony".
Existence/Leibniz: Question: "Why is there anything at all and not rather nothing?".
This question remains, even if we have secured the unity of the multiplicity. There could still be nothing!
Cf. >
Substance/Spinoza, >
Substance/Leibniz.
I 76
Assuming that things must exist, one must also be able to specify the reason why they must exist in this way and not otherwise.
I 97f
Unity/Leibniz: a motionless unity of the world would only be one with many qualities.
I 127
Unity/multiplicity/modality/modal/Leibniz/Holz: the difference between the world in its totality and the diversity of its parts requires a modal distinction in the concept of the world.
The fact that the world is, may mean that it is summed up in one point, or that it is perceived as an extended multiplicity "extensive" or "perceived".
As a set of separate parts.
Scholasticism: "partes extra partes".
I 128
Unity: unity is a substance or an aspect of being.
Multiplicity: multiplicity is a phenomenon or an appearance aspect.
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Phenomena/Leibniz.
