I 253
Pylyshyn: Problem: internal knowledge representation. Vs Visual ideas as a qualitatively independent or theoretically adequate form of mental representation.
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Representation, >
Knowledge representation.
Imagination, visual/Kosslyn: Question: do they differ from other conceptions in structure and function?
I 253
Interpretation: we are never aware of having to interpret imaginary images.
There are no incomplete ideas, for example that half a sofa is missing.
But too much storage capacity would be necessary to store all the information from the retina.
I 256
Besides, there would be no practical access if all of them were stored.
So there must be some interpretation.
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Interpretation.
Pictorial ideas are never necessarily true. (In contrast to some propositions).
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Necessity, >
Logical truth, >
Truth.
Visual imagination/Kosslyn: mere having does not imply that there is a causal role here.
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Causality, >
Causal role.
I 260
Thesis: Our perception consists of parts assigned to objects.
KosslynVsPylyshyn: we do have imaginary images. Even if they are not scanned internally.
If the images are saved uninterpreted, you do not need too much time to access them.
I 253
Imagination/visual imagination/image/picture/Kosslyn/Pomerantz: Interpretation: we are never aware of the need to interpret mental images. There are no incomplete ideas about e.g. that the half of a sofa is lacking. There would be no practical access, if all imaginations were saved. So there must be some interpretation.
I 257
Pylyshyn Thesis: there must be a third code between language and visual presentation - problem: that is uneconomical.
Stephen M. Kosslyn/James R. Pomerantz, Imagery, Propositions and the Form of Internal Representations”, Cognitive Psychology 9 (1977), 52-76
