Cresswell II 154
Making rigid/description/Kripke/Cresswell: (Kripke 1977, 259f)
(1):
Normal description/Logical Form/Cresswell: "The F is G" is true in any possible world w iff. the thing that is (unambiguously) F in w is also G in w.
Rigid description/logical form: here is this true in w iff. the thing that is in the actual world F is G in w, whether or not it is F there in w.
Current world: which world is the actual one, is again relative to the standpoint: every world is for itself the actual one.
Rigid description/logical form: the rigid description must therefore involve two worlds: for we must say
"The F is G" is true in w2 as seen from w1, iff. the thing that is F in w1 is G in w2.
Double indexing/multiple indexing/terminology/Cresswell: it is called like this in Kamp (1971)
(2), but it is almost not quite used in Lewis (1970. 185f)
(3). Explicitly in Stalnaker (1978, 320)
(4) as the formalization of Kripke's approach about names. It seems to be accepted in Kaplan (1979)
(5).
>
Descriptions, >
Names, >
Possible world, >
Semantics of possible worlds.
(1) Kripke, S. (1977): Speaker’s reference and semantic reference. In: Midwest Studies In Philosophy, Vol. 2(1), pp. 255 - 276.
(2) Kamp, H. (1971): To the memory of Arthur Prior Formal properties of ‘now’. In: Theoria, Vol. 37(3), pp. 227-273.
(3)
(4) Stalnaker, R. (1978): Assertion. In: Syntax and Semantics (New York Academic Press), Vol. 9, pp. 315-332.
(5) Kaplan, D. (1979): On the Logic of Demonstratives, Journal of Philosophical Logic, VIII 1978: 81–98; and reprinted in French et al. (eds.), Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1979): 401–412.