Correction: (max 500 charact.)
The complaint will not be published.
II 173
Denotation/Russell/Hintikka: N.B.: a brilliant feature of Russell's theory of the denotation of 1905 is that it is the quantifiers which denote!
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Quantifiers .
Theory of Denotation/Russell: (end of "On Denoting") thesis: the theory of denotation contains the reduction of denotation on objects of acquaintance.
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Acquaintance .
II 174
Hintikka: this connection is amazing. It also appears to be circular, only to admit objects of acquaintance.
Solution: we must see what successfully denotating phrases actually denote: they denote objects of acquaintance.
Unambiguity/uniqueness/Hintikka: it is precisely ambiguity that leads to the failure of the existential generalization.
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Existential generalization .
E.g. Waverley/Russell/Hintikka: that only objects of acquaintance are permitted, shows its own example: "the author of Waverley" in (1) is indeed a primary event, that is, his example (2).
"Whether"/"if"/Russell/Hintikka: only difference: Russell and Hintikka wanted to know if "instead of" "did not know".
Secondary Denotation/Russell: one can also say that George wanted to know from the man who actually wrote Waverley if he was Scott.
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Waverley-example .
II 175
That would be the case if George IV had seen Scott (at a distance) and asked "Is that Scott?".
HintikkaVsRussell: why does Russell choose an example with a perceptually known individual? Do we not normally deal with individuals of flesh and blood, whose identity is known to us, rather than merely with perceptual objects?
Knowledge who/what/perception object/Russell/Hintikka: precisely in the case of perception objects, it seems as if the kind of uniqueness that we need for a to-know-who does not exist.
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Identification .