Lexicon of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]


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Sc. Camps
Theses I
Theses II

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II 98
Individual Domain/possible worlds/Montague/Hintikka: thesis: Montague assumes a constant domain of individuals.
>Possible worlds.
HintikkaVsMontague: precisely this assumption leads to problems. Especially in religious contexts.
Individual/Montague: individuals are the domain of functions that function as the sense of a singular term.
>Singular terms.
Belief Context/opaque context/belief/propositional attitude/HintikkaVsMontague: problem: Montague does not allow a special approach (setting contexts) for contexts with propositional attitudes. E.g. "knowing who", e.g. "remembering where", e.g. "seeing what". This is a defect because Montague had been interested in propositional attitudes.
>Propositional attitudes.
II 176
Domain/variable/individual variable/quantification/Hintikka: my own approach (semantics of possible worlds) has been called "interpretation of the restricted domain".
HintikkaVs: this misunderstands the logical situation: it is about the fact that the individuals have to be well-defined for the set of worlds with which we have to deal.
N.B.: the set of worlds changes with the propositional attitudes. So the actual world, e.g. does not have to be included!
Cf. >Hyperintensionality.
Propositional Attitudes/Hintikka/(s): different attitudes (beliefs, doubts, seeing, etc.) demand different sets of worlds.
Variables/values/Hintikka: it may be that the domain of our variables can be a superset of the set of the actual individuals (if the set of possible worlds does not contain the actual world).
E.g. it may be that someone has correct beliefs about all the actual individuals, but also mistakenly believes that there are still more individuals that he only imagines.
Hintikka: therefore my approach can be called with the same right one of the "extended domains".
II 176
Individual domain/domain/Russell/Hintikka: Russell, on the other hand, seems to have actually represented a set of the restricted domain by restricting it to objects of acquaintance.
II 196
Possible world/individual domain/HintikkaVsKripke: one should not demand that the individuals must remain the same when changing from world to world. The speech of worlds is empty if there is possible experience that could make them different.
Cf. >Centered worlds.
Possible worlds/Hintikka: possible worlds should be best determined as by the connected possible totals of experience.
And then separation cannot be excluded.
II 196
Separation/Hintikka: separation is useful in a few models of cross-world identification, re-identification in time. E.g. a computer could be dismantled and two computers could be built from it. This could be revised later.
Re-identification/Hintikka: re-identification is the key to cases of separation and fusion.
Separation/Hintikka: there is a structural reason why separation is so rare: if world lines are composed of infinitesimal elements as the solutions of differential equations, the separation corresponds to a singularity, and this is a rare phenomenon.
Separation/Hintikka: the arguments against them are circular in a deep sense. They are based on the idea that for quantification the individual area should remain fixed (HintikkaVsKripke).
Cf. >Systems S4/S5

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