Lexicon of Arguments

 

I 103
Knowledge/Consciousness/color researcher Mary/Jackson/Nagel/Chalmers: (Jackson 1982⁽¹⁾, Nagel 1974⁽²⁾). E.g. Color researcher Mary knows everything there is to know about colors - but she has never seen colors. >F.Jackson, >Qualia/Jackson.
All neurophysical knowledge cannot explain how it is to see red. The knowledge of how it is (experience) does not follow from physical knowledge alone.
>Knowledge how, >Explanation.
Bat-Example/Nagel/Chalmers: boils down to the same: it remains an open question: it is compatible with all physical facts that bats or even mice have a consciousness, and it is also compatible with them that they have none.
>What is it like to be a bat?
I 104
Jackson/Chalmers: Jackson has presented his argument JacksonVsMaterialism, not VsReductionism, not against a reductive explanation of our conscious experience.
>Reductionism, >Materialism, >VsReductionism, >VsMaterialism.
See also Lewis (1990)⁽³⁾, and Nemirov (1990)⁽⁴⁾.
I 141
Knowledge/intension/fact/Chalmers: every time, if one knows a fact under one way of giveness, but not under another, there will be an additional, different fact which one does not know. E.g. Morning star/Evening Star, Superman/Clark Kent, Water/H₂O.
>Morning Star/Evening Star, >Superman/Clark Kent.
I 142
The new fact that one learns (also e.g. color researcher Mary, when she first sees a color) is a fact in relation to the way of giveness.
>Way of being given, >Intension.

1. F. Jackson, Ephiphenomenal qualia. Philosophical Quarterly 32, 1982: pp. 127-36
2. Th. Nagel What it is like to be a bat? Philosophical Review 4, 1974: pp. 435-50
3. D. Lewis, What experience teaches. In: W. Lycan (Ed) Mind and Cognition. Oxford 1990
4. L. Nemirow, Physicalism and the cognitive role of acquaintance. In: W. Lycan (Ed) Mind and Cognition. Oxford 1990