I 173
Phenomenal Judgments/Chalmers: phenomenal judgements are the core of the relationships between cognition and consciousness. These are verbal expressions of assertions about consciousness.
>
Phenomena, >
Cognition, >
Consciousness.
I 174
Judgment/Chalmers: judgements can be taken as what I and my zombie twin have in common.
>
Zombies.
Semantic content/Chalmers: semantic content, on the other hand, is formed partly by conscious experiences themselves (e.g., beliefs about sensations of red). The judgments of the zombies have only the same form as my reports, they have no content.
>
Experience.
I 175
I can only refer to the judgments of the zombies in a deflationist manner ((s) quoting into it).
>
Deflationism.
Content/Chalmers: content can be attributed only by phenomenal beliefs, but it is unclear what role consciousness plays in this.
>
Content, >
Semantic content.
Phenomenal Judgments/Chalmers:
1st level: concerns the objects of experience. This is about awareness.
>
Awareness/Chalmers.
I 176
2nd level: Judgments on conscious experiences. E.g. I note that I have an experience of something red. Such judgments can also be about kinds of experiences.
3rd level: on conscious experiences as a type of experience. E.g. about the fact that we have conscious experiences at all and how this can be explained.
I 177
Problem: Consciousness cannot be explained reductively, but judgments have to be explained because they are in the field of psychology.
Paradoxically, consciousness is ultimately irrelevant to the explanation of phenomenal judgments. (Avshalom Elitzur (1989)
(1), Roger Shepard (Psychologist, 1993)
(2).
I 288
Judgement/phenomenal judgement/Qualia/Chalmers: a complete theory of the mind must provide (a) a nonreductive explanation of consciousness, and (b) a reductive explanation,...
I 289
...why we judge that we are conscious.
>
Consciousness/Chalmers, >
Reduction/Chalmers.
Even if consciousness itself is not part of the explanation of phenomenal judgments, the roots of consciousness will be.
I 290
Consciousness system: has itself no access to information such as "This pattern has a wavelength of 500 nanometers" nor "There is now a 50 Hertz vibration in the brain". The system only has access to the localization in the information space. Thus the system finds itself in a place of this space. Later it can find names like "red", "green" etc. for it. Also the differences can only be expressed with such names of Qualia.
>
Qualia, >
Color words.
I 292
A conscious experience is a realization of an information state, a phenomenal judgment is explained by a different realization of the same information state. If we then postulate a phenomenal aspect of information, we have everything we needed to make sure our judgments are correct.
1. A. Elitzur, Consciousness and the incompleteness of the physical explanation of behavior. Journal of Mind and Behavior 10, 1989,: pp. 1-20.
2. R. N. Shepard, On the physical baisis, ölinguistic representation and conscious experiences of colors. In: G. Harman (Ed) Conceptions of the human Mind: Essays in Honor of George A. Miller, Hillsdale NJ 1993.
