Lexicon of Arguments

 Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]


Complaints - Corrections

Table
Concepts
Versus
Sc. Camps
Theses I
Theses II

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I 22
Language/Qualia/Phenomenology/Psychology/Chalmers: we have no special language for phenomenal qualities. We must always describe them in terms of external properties, e.g. Colorful experiences.
>Experience, >Qualia, >Everyday Language, >Consciousness/Chalmers.
Feeling language/Ryle: he was right: we have no "neat" words for feeling.
>G. Ryle, >Sensations.
I 23
Sensation/Criterion/Wittgenstein: an inner process needs external criteria.
>Sensations/Wittgenstein, >L. Wittgenstein.
Chalmers: nevertheless, why should one not assume that ultimately only one property (be it phenomenal or psychological) is involved?
ChalmersVs: if a phenomenal property is specified by a psychological concept, it is not a psychological property - it is only a "property specified by a psychological concept".
>Psychology/Chalmers.
Definition/specification/Chalmers: we must not say, the concept "conscious experience" was defined by the psychological property! The usually common occurrence of circumstances cannot be used for definition.
>Correlation, >Definition, >Definability.

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