I 83
Moral/Aesthetics/Chalmers: it is often said that there is no conceptual connection between physical properties and moral or aesthetic properties. This does not mean, however, that moral and aesthetic properties are as problematic as conscious experiences.
Cf. >
Consciousness/Chalmers, >
Experience.
1. Is a possible world conceivable, which is physically indistinguishable from ours, but morally different?
>
Conceivability.
2. Are moral facts not phenomena that impose themselves upon us? We can deny them. This is done by moral antirealists such as Blackburn (1971)
(1) and Hare (1984)
(2).
I 84
Moral/Supervenience/Boyd/Brink/Chalmers: Boyd (1988)
(3) and Brink (1989)
(4) Thesis: moral facts supervene on natural facts with an a posteriori necessity. That is, they suprvene on the secondary, not the primary, intension of moral concepts. (> Horgan and Timmons, 1992a
(5), 1992b
(6)).
>
Intensions, >
Primary intensions,
>
Propositions/Chalmers, >
Supervenience, >
a posteriori necessity.
1. S. Blackburn, Moral realism. IN. J. Casey (Ed) Morality and Moral Reasoning, London 1971.
2. R. M. Hare, Supervenience. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl.58, 1984: pp. 1-16
3. R. N. Boyd, How to be a moral realist. In G. Syre-McCord (Ed), Essays on Moral Realism. Ithaca, NY 1988
4. D. Brink, Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics. Cambridge 1989.
5. T. Horgan and M. Timmons, Troubles for new ware moral sentiments; The "open question argument" revived. Philosophical Papers 1992.
6. T. Horgan and M. Timmons, Trouble on moral twin earth: Moral Queerness revived. Synthese 92, 1992: pp. 223-60.