I 13
Introspection/Psychology/Phenomenology/Behavior/Consciousness/Wundt/Chalmers: if one were to use introspection like e.g. Wilhelm Wundt, in order to explain behavior, one would behave 1. Cartesian, and 2. one makes phenomenology the referee on psychology. >
Phenomenology/Chalmers.
I 26
Introspection/Chalmers: introspection is the way we become clear about the content of our inner states. This is an important component of our everyday concept of consciousness. Introspection can be analyzed in terms of a rational process of open-mindedness for information about inner states and the ability to apply this information meaningfully.
Cf. >
Awareness/Chalmers, >
Content/Chalmers.
Status reports: require additional language control.
>
First person, >
Incorrigibility.
I 189
Introspection/Consciousness/Explanation/Dennett/Chalmers: (Dennett, 1979
(1)) ... there are public reports about our consciousness and episodes of our propositional awareness, our judgments and - as far as introspection is concerned - darkness (1979, p.95).
ChalmersVsDennett: then Dennett's introspection is very different from mine. I find sensations, feelings, pain, etc., although they are accompanied by judgments, they themselves are not merely judgments.
I 190
Introspection/Chalmers: Dennett's approach is better described than extrospection. He starts from the outside to explore his inner being.
Dennett/Chalmers: (in Dennett, 1991
(2), pp 363-364): what is the point is to explain why things appear to us as they do. And that would explain everything that needs to be explained.
Appearing/ChalmersVsDnett: There are two meanings of apparition:
a) phenomenal ("how it is ...")
b) psychologically (as disposition for judgments).
Dennett's theory explains only b).
>
Psychology, >
Disposition, >
Judgments, >
Behavior, >
Explanation.
1. D. Dennett, On the absence of phenomenology,. In: D. Gustafson and B Tapscott, (Eds) Body, Mind, and Method, Dordrecht 1979.
2. D. Dennett, Consciousness Explained, Boston, 1991
