Lexicon of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]


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Sc. Camps
Theses I
Theses II

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I XI
Definition The Easy Problem/Consciousness/Chalmers: “easy” problems of consciousness: How does the brain process environmental stimulation?
I XII
How does it integrate information?
How do we produce reports on internal states?
I XIII
If you only work on the "easy” problem, you get one sort of theory; if you believe, that there is a further “hard” problem, then you get another.
Cf. >Computer model, >Computation, >Thinking, >World/thinking,
>Stimuli, >Stimulus meaning, >Information, >Cognition,
>Cognitive psychology.
I XII
Definition The Hard Problem of Consciousness/Chalmers: Why is all this processing (of stimulation, of information) accompanied by an experienced inner life?
Thesis: The standard methods of neuroscience and cognitive science do not work in addressing them.
I 4
Central is experience, but it is not definition. It is fruitless to define conscious experience in terms of more primitive notions.
>Experience.
I 5
When I am talking about it here, I mean only the subjective quality of experience. ((s) And this is not to be confused with self-experience).
Cf. >Knowing how, >Self-knowledge, >Self-identification, >Self-consciousness.
I 26
Consciousness/Chalmers: also this term has two aspects:
A) psychological (behavior explaining, functional) - concerns reports and introspective accessibility to information. (From now on called "consciousness").
>Awareness/Chalmers, >Behavior, >Explanation, >Introspection.
B) phenomenal (>Qualia/Chalmers, see also more authors on qualities).
Psychological Consciousness/Chalmers: psychological consciousness is introspection, alertness, ability to reflect the content of mental states, self-awareness.
>Content, >Mental states.
71
Consciousness/Chalmers: as almost the only phenomenon, conscious experience does not logically supervene on something else.
Otherwise, virtually all natural phenomena are globally logically supervenient to facts about atoms, electromagnetic fields, etc.
But that does not mean that all higher-level properties are based on micro-physical laws.
>Supervenience.

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