II 184
Rules/Cavell: contrary to a widespread idea rules do not always have something to do with commands.
Thesis: there is a complementarity of rules and determinations.
II 185
You can describe an actual action, or perform it according to rules.
II 186
Now one can say according to binding rules that it is wrong (an abuse) to say "I know it" if one is not sure.
The only relevant condition is that one speaks grammatically correct.
It follows, however, that our statements S, T, and T' are not only non-analytic, but also not synthetic! (not like, for example, the synthetic statement that someone who dresses himself voluntarily dresses himself).
For example, the determination in question are similar to "The future will be the past" but:
If the future is not "like" the past, no one will be surprised by that.
II 196
Rule/determination/Cavell: there is a complementarity between the two. How could we overlook it?
Because of the false assumption that a rule must be in imperative ("You should") instead of simply describing how something is done.
II 197
Rule/Cavell: I do not deny that they can never be associated with imperatives, but only that this is always possible.
E.g. Chess: I probably forget to say "J'adoube", so I have to be brought to do it...
II 198
...but I do not forget how the trains are made. I do not have to be brought to do this.
Cf. >
Chess.
II 201
Rule/Principle/Cavell: Difference: Rules say how to do a thing,
Principles tell you how to make a thing good!
>
Principles, cf. >
Laws.
