Lexicon of Arguments

 

Chisholm II 231
Judgment/Brentano: Judgments are obvious from the concepts precisely when they are judgments about concepts.
Concept/Brentano: Knowledge about concepts is directly evident from inner perception. >Concepts, >Perception, >Introspection.
II 232
From the existence of a conceptual relation, however, it does not follow yet that we acknowledge it. It must be made accessible to the perception.
Judgment/false/Brentano/Marek: Wrong judgment on concepts is therefore a modifying determination, such as e.g. "false gold". A wrong judgment is not a judgment at all.
((s): Frege would say: a false judgment is always about an object, not a concept.)
II 233
Truth/Evidence/Truth-Functional/Brentano/Marek: That there can nevertheless be a dispute about conceptual truth can be explained by the fact that not every judgment about concepts must be evident. Blind, non-evident judgments are also conceivable. For example, if you only trust authorities. But these are also real judgments.
II 234
Judgments are plausible precisely when the conceptual relationship is understood.


Chisholm II = Johann Christian Marek Zum Programm einer Deskriptiven Psychologie in Philosophische Ausätze zu Ehren Roderick M. Chisholm Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg (Hg), Amsterdam 1986