Chisholm I 130
Unity of Consciousness/Brentano
(1): if a person imagines something, or at the same time imagines several objects, he also recognizes at the same time the simultaneity of both. For example, if one hears a melody, he hears the one tone as present while he perceives the other as past. ... in which of the experiences is the idea of their simultaneity? In none! >
Imagination.
On the contrary, it is clear that the inner cognition of the one with the other belongs to the same real unity.
I 131
Consciousness/Chisholm/Unity/Brentano/Chisholm: suggests the following principle: if it is certain for x that it is F and also that it is G, then it is also certain that it is F and G. Cf. >
Perception/Kant.
This seems unquestionable on the basis of Kant's transcendental unity of apperception.
ChisholmVs: it seems to be too strict, however.
Kant: the subject, does not need to unite the ideas, it only needs to appear that it could.
If it is true for x that it is F, and also that it is G, and it is considering the question whether it is both F and G, then it is certain for it.
I 132
This also applies to proposed premises.
1. F. Brentano, Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt, Hamburg, 1973, p. 227f
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Chisholm II 269
Consciousness/Brentano/Hedwig: Brentano has never admitted the psychological abyss of consciousness, but always insisted on the uniqueness of thinking.
Chisholm II =
Klaus Hedwig Brentano und Kopernikus in Philosophische Ausätze zu Ehren Roderick M. Chisholm Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg (Ed.), Amsterdam 1986