Wright I 267
Rules/Wittgenstein/Wright: whatever Wittgenstein's dialectics exactly achieve, in any case it enforces some kind of restriction for a realistic notion of rules and meaning.
>
Rules/Wittgenstein, >
Rule following/Wittgenstein,
>
Meaning/Wittgenstein, >
Meaning.
I 268
And therefore also for truth, since truth is a function of meaning.
I 269
Paul Boghossian: he has now presented an approach that could eliminate both concerns:
I 270
Boghossian: we consider a non-factualism which is exclusively concerned with meaning (not truth):
There is no property of the kind that a word means something, and consequently no such fact.
>
Facts, >
Properties.
Since the truth condition of a proposition is a function of its meaning, non-factualism necessarily implies a non-factualism with regard to the truth conditions.
>
Truth conditions.
Then the following results:
(5) For all S, P: "S has the truth condition P" is not truth conditional.
According to quotation redemption:
(4) For each S: "S" is not truth conditional.
>
Truth conditional semantics.
"Fascinating Consequence"/Boghossian: of a non-factualism of the meaning: a global non-factualism. And precisely in this, a non-factualism differs from the meaning of non-factualism with respect to any other object.
I 271
WrightVsBoghosian: many will protest against his implicit philosophy of truth, but nothing can be objected to the use of the word alone.
Boghossian: Global Minimalism, Non-Factualism: regarding meaning, not truth: There is no property that a word means something, and consequently no fact, is a result of global nonfactualism, as opposed to all other nonfactualisms.
Wright I 271
Realism/Wright: so far, the question has been asked which additional realism-relevant properties can make the truth predicate "substantive".
We can now use "correctness" ("correct") for the minimum case. (Formal >
correctness).
The thesis of non-factualism can then be formulated in such a way that any discourse on meaning and related terms is at most capable of being correct, and does not qualify for more substantial properties.
(i) It is not the case that "S has the truth condition that P" has a truth condition.
As a minimalist, one has to accept this, since truth conditions attribute a semantic, i.e., substantive property, and this is denied by the proposition.
>
Semantic properties.
Next:
(ii) It is not the case that "S has the truth condition that P" is true.
I 272
This follows from (i) since only one sentence with a truth condition can be true. Next:
(iii) It is not the case that S has the truth condition that P
This follows, according to Boghossian, "due to the quotation redemption properties of the truth predicate".
>
Truth predicate, >
Disquotation, >
Disquotationalism,
>
Deflationism.
I 272ff
Nonfactualism/Boghossian/Wright: > then every discourse can be at the most correct. (i) is not the case that "S has the truth condition that P" has a truth condition" - WrightVs: can be reworded with quotation redemption (vi) is not the case that it is not the case that S has the truth condition that P has a truth condition - but denial of truth is not inconsistent with the correctness of the assertion, however, (i) is not correct if both truth and correctness are involved, the matrix for that truth predicate (Definition) does not have to be conservative:
i.e. That the value of ""A"is true" becomes false or incorrect in all cases, except where A is attributed with the value true. ((s) Non-conservativity demands truth, not just correctness, >
truth transfer.
"Correct": truth predicate "correct" is for minimal discourses that can be true.
Negation/Logic/Truth/Correctness/Correct: If both truth and correctness are involved, there is a distinction (> negation) between the:
a) real, strict negation: it transforms each true or correct sentence into a false or incorrect one, another negation form is:
b) negation: it acts so that a true (or correct) proposition is constructed exactly when its argument does not reach any truth.
>
Negation/Boghossian.
