Field II 255
Definition "surface logic"/material conditional/paradoxes of implication/Field: the surface logic tells us which conclusions are acceptable. (This is just the logic of Adams offered by nonfactualism).
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Conditional/Adams, >
Acceptability.
Def "depth logic"/material conditional/Field: the depths logic tells us which conclusions are truth maintaining. This is the standard logic for ">".
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Truth transfer.
Problem: does the depth logic do anything at all, even if our mental performance is explained by the surface logic?
Solution/Field: Perhaps one can say that at the deepest level classical logic prevails and the special conventions of the assertion only come later.
II 256
Factualism/Field: It must then distinguish between levels of total unacceptability (i.e., on the surface) and acceptability at a deep level (which only seems unacceptable by a superficial violation of the convention).
Deflationism/Field: the deflationism between nonfactualism and factualism can be distinguished in the same way without using the terms "true" or "fact".
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Deflationalism.
Field II 256
Factualism/Conditional/Stalnaker/Field: (Stalnaker 1984)
(1): (here, at first limited to non-embedded conditionals): here his approach provides the logic of Adams, i.e. Factualism is indistinguishable from nonfactualism in relation to which conclusions ("paradox of material implication") are considered correct.
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Paradox of Implication.
Deflationism/Field: can he differentiate between nonfactualism and factualism?
One possibility is that if there are conditionals where the antecedent is logically and metaphysically possible, but not epistemically.
Nonfactualism: thesis: in epistemic impossibility of the anteceding of a conditional, there is no question of acceptability.
For the joke of conditionals consists in the assumption that their antecedents are possible epistemically.
N.B.: then all conditionals with epistemically unacceptable antecedents are equally acceptable.
FieldVsStalnaker: for him there is a fact due to which a conditional is true or false. And some conditionals with epistemically impossible antecedents will be true and others false!
Factualism/Deflationism/Field: the test of whether someone adheres to this type of factualism is then whether he takes acceptability of such conditionals seriously.
1. R. Stalnaker (1984). Inquiry. Cambridge University Press.