Lexicon of Arguments

 

Avramides I 92
Beliefs/Desires/Attributions/Radical Interpretation/Peacocke/Avramidis: Suppose we could attribute beliefs and desires before the knowledge of the language.
In this case, simultaneous attribution of propositional attitudes would still be necessary.
>Propositional attitudes, >Thinking without language, >Desires,
>Beliefs.
But not particular propositional attitudes before language.
>Language, >Understanding, >Language use.
PeacockeVs "actual language relation": this supposedly needs no semantic vocabulary.
>Reference, cf. >Primitive reference, >Semantics.
Peacocke later: Gricean intentions cannot be used as evidence for radical interpretation, but that's not VsGrice.
>Intentions/Grice, >P. Grice.
- - -
Peacocke I 78f
Propositional Attitudes/Attribution/Peacocke: Problem: instead of one set of propositional attitudes another can also be attributed.
Solution/Peacocke: Relation of Closeness/Narrowness.
E.g. someone who rearranges something on the table usually does not respond to the compass direction. - The concepts may then have different expressiveness.
Important point: if it is a rotating table, the space-relative concepts can change while the table-relative ones remain constant.
((s) The concepts do not change, but their truth values.)
More expressive: the space-relative concepts. - Problem: if they are used here, there may be an explanatory gap.
>narrow concepts.
I 83
We should not attribute any wider concepts if there more narrow ones are available.
>Narrow/wide.