Münch III 296
Definition Perception/Quine/Schnelle: getting aware of an irritation.
Münch III 298
Quine, "the animal responds to the semi-circle on the screen" - SchnelleVsQuine: how does he know that? - Maybe it just avoids pain.
Helmut Schnelle, Introspection and the Description of Language Use“, in: Florian Coulmas (Ed) Festschrift for native speaker, Den Haag 1981, 105-126.
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Quine VI 2
Perception/Quine: Input: is not objects, but activation of our sensory receptors. - We must justify ourselves with stimulus influences. Stimulus influences instead of observation and instead of documents.
>
Stimulus/Quine.
VI 100
Perception/Quine: is neurophysiologically recordable in principle - beliefs cannot be recorded.
V 15
Perception/Quine: this is about form, not about stimuli (these fall under reception).
V 18
Perception/Quine: has more to do with consciousness than with the reception of stimuli. But it is also accessible to behavioral criteria. It shows itself in the conditioning of reactions.
V 33
Similarity/perception/ontology/Quine: the transition from perception to perceptual similarity brings ontological clarity: perception (the result of the act of perception) is omitted.
V 36
Perception Similarity/Quine: one is inclined to speak here of similarity in certain respects.
V 37
Quine: this is convenient in practice, but dispensable in theory, if you extend similarity as above by many digits.
Learning/Perception/Similarity/Perception Similarity/Quine: in learning, different degrees of similarity must play a role.
N.B.: otherwise any enhanced reaction would be conditioned equally to any future episode, since they would all be equally similar!
N.B.: it follows from this that the standards of perceptual similarity must be innate.
VI 1
Perception/Language/World: our systematic theory about the outside world has evolved over generations. It allows us to predict future sensory stimuli. Thus, amidst the maze of stimuli, we have a theory that helps us to verify predictions.
>
Predictions/Quine.
VI 2
Perception/Observation/Quine: what is observation is not easy to analyze. Our input does not consist in objects, but in the activation of our sensory receptors.
We must justify ourselves with stimulus influences, and renounce the objects! (Also on corresponding singular terms).
Def Stimulus Influence/Quine: the temporally ordered set of all perceptual receptors of the subject that are activated at an event.
VI 3
Observation/Quine: this is how we manage to renounce the term "observation" as an independent technical term! (In favour of stimulus influence).
VI 26
Perception/Quine: I have always spoken of neuronal receptors and their stimulation and never of sense data. (>
Naturalized Epistemology).
Sense Data/Quine: are cartesian! >
Cartesianism.
VI 86
Perception/Learning/Language/Quine: two of Otto's perception situations that it is raining will differ not only in time, but also in neuronal terms.
They are probably too complicated to be described neuronally at all, since there are many different signs of rain.
But there must still be some common neuronal characteristic for the class of these processes, because after all it was stimulus generalizations that were responsible for Otto learning it.
Then we can transfer this class to a whole population. However, it is even more inaccessible because the nervous systems of different individuals are networked differently.
VI 89
Perception/Criteria/Quine: of things: Example "x perceives that p". Problem: the light in which we see an object always comes from the sun or another source.
VI 90
Can we resort to criteria?
No: because we also want to allow a bowl to be perceived by the fact that it is reflected in something.
Solution: focal point: we want to distinguish between seeing a glass and seeing through this glass. But causal relationships and the focal point are not yet sufficient. Some part of the surface of our bowl would satisfy this condition no less than the whole bowl itself.
VI 91
So we need whole sentences to get through them to the terms.
VI 92
Perception/Quine: For example "x perceives that p" drives the speech of perceptions to undreamt-of heights. So we should even notice that Newton's laws imply Kepler's!
But condition: only on the occasion of the situation in which we take note for the first time that p, they say of us, we noticed that p.
VI 93
Perception/Quine: is only one event in a subject at a time. We register foreign perceptions through the behavior of a subject and our empathy.
VI 94
It is more difficult to empathize with the belief of others: although we understand the belief of the dog that he will get his food, how do we understand that someone believes in transubstantiation during the Eucharist? >
Behaviorism.
VI 100
Perception/Quine: we have already seen that a neurological generalization of our perceptions is not possible because of the different situations, viewpoints and different neural networks.
Nevertheless, every perception is in principle completely describable using strictly neurological terms! However, this does not apply to belief.
