II (e) 116f
Truth/Rorty: love of truth not as love for something non-human, but as relation to the fellow human beings. Love of truth as affable willingness to talk made the quasi-object as the target of a search (Platonic idea of the natural order or universally valid convictions, Habermas) entirely superfluous.
III 100
Truth/Art/ethics/Rorty: with Davidson, I believe that the distinction true/false can also be applied to sentences of the type "Yeats was a great poet" and "democracy is better than tyranny".
V 32
Semantic theory of truth/Tarski: Truth leads back to justification.
- - -
VI 8f
Truth: absolute concept: in the following sense: true for me, but not for you... in my culture, but not in yours, true back then, but not today such statements are strange and pointless.
It makes more sense: justified for me but not for you.
>
Truth criterion, >
Justification.
VI 11
Justification: relative! Justification is a criterion for truth.
VI 199
Truth: not a goal of research! A goal is something of which you can know if you are heading towards or coming away from it.
>
Goals.
VI 327
Truth/Rorty: is a property of sentences.
Truth/existence/Rorty: Of course it was true in the past that women should not be suppressed, just like the planetary orbits were true!
Truth is ahistorical, but this is not so because true statements are made true by ahistorical entities.
>
Truthmakers.
- - -
Horwich I 444
Pragmatism/James/Davidson/Rorty: 1) Truth is not used explanatorily. - 2) beliefs are explained by causal relation. - 3) There are no true-makers. - 4) If no true-makers, then no dispute between realism and anti-realism that accepts this true-makers.
Horwich I 454
Truth/DavidsonVsTarski/Rorty: can therefore not be defined in terms of satisfaction or something else. - We can only say that the truth of a statement depends on the meaning of the words and the arrangement of the world. - So we are rid of the correspondence theory.
>
Correspondence, >
Correspondence theory.
Horwich I 456
Truth/Putnam: if they were not a property, the truth conditions would be everything you could know about them.
Putnam pro truth as a property.
Putnam: Then our thoughts would not be thoughts.
>
Truth conditions.
