Correction: (max 500 charact.)
The complaint will not be published.
I 21
Truth/belief/Prior: Truth cannot only be applied to propositions, but also to belief: logical form: "(X thinks that) p and p" (bracket). - But determination of truth does not ascribe a property to any proposition (always facts are decisive).
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Propositions , >
Facts .
A fact is possible without a believed proposition.
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Beliefs , >
Thinking .
Problem/Moore: if no one believes that the belief must be false, even if it would be correct if someone believes that!
((s) This is due to non-existence).
PriorVs: this is a misconception of belief as a relation to facts.
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Relation theory .
I 98
Truth/PriorVsTarski: you could also see it as an adverb (quasi-property) instead regarding it as a property: E.g. "when someone says that snow is white, he says it truthfully".
Cf. >
Truth/Tarski , >
Truth definition/Tarski .
Prior: with me there is no mention, only use.
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Quotation marks , >Quotation/disquotation, >
Disquotation scheme , >
Mention/use .
Prior: the sentencenly >snow is white" is only about snow, not about truth. - There is no metalanguage.
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Metalanguage .
PriorVsTarski: for me the truth is as much about the things that someone thinks, fears, etc. - Then you can also think that you think something wrong.
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Thinking , >
Self-reference .
I 106
Truth/meaning/Buridan: every sentence means that it is true itself (in addition to what else it means).
Prior: we have to admit that a sentence can have several meanings at the same time.
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Meaning , >
Sentence meaning , >
Ambiguity .
Then the sentence is non-paradoxically wrong (contradictorily) if it is to mean that it is wrong. - But there is no "secondary meaning" and "principle B".
Cf. >
Paradoxes .