Lexicon of Arguments

 

I 182ff
Truth/Frege/Brandom: indefinable - The accuracy of inferences is not explained by something more fundamental, the power of the judgment is not explained by the fact that it would explicitly say of a sentence that it is true - Inference: there are erroneous conclusions because of irrelevance.
I 224
Truth/Brandom: the distinction between true and false sentences is related to the objectives for which one wants to use the language.
Philosophical semantics: has to do with practice - "horse" only means something in one practice. >Meaning, >Practise, >Semantics.
I 226
Grice: contents through intention. >Intentions, >Content.
I 410
Truth/Reference/Brandom: the expressive function of "true" and "refers to" is incompatible with the explanatory function that is assigned to those expressions in the traditional theories.
I 412
Once the expressive role is properly understood, representation can no longer be accepted as a basic concept.
I ~ 463
Truth/Reference/Brandom: with a purely linguistic approach you can make assertions about extra-linguistic referential relations - truth is not to be a relation between executions and object - new: anaphorically indirect descriptions - word-word relation.
I 461ff
Truth/Brandom: is no relation - truth is no property, grammatical misunderstandings, philosophical fictions.
Instead: anaphoric analysis - "true" has merely superficial predicate form.
BrandomVsFrege: false search for "common proposition" of true sentences.
Solution: expressive power of "true" decides whether allocation is justified.
I 468
Truth/Brandom: "is true" is a pro-sentence forming operator, not a predicate, truth is not a property. >Prosentential theory.