Lexicon of Arguments

 

IV 119
A discourse on mental images is not less intersubjective as a discourse on objects.
>Intersubjectivity.
IV 115
If having this imagination is constructed with the help of my ability to describe descriptions or images of imagination, then these descriptions are not descriptions or representations of the idea, but rather imagination descriptions and imagination representations.
What happens is rather the replacement of alleged statements about imaginations by statements about objects and events.
IV 124
Mental image: a mental image is not an intangible image but a skill.
I can, for example, say to the extent that I have a mental image of a horse, as I am able to draw a horse, or to describe it.
IV 122ff
Sometimes this is uncertain and the linguistic reports cannot always be taken at face value. The request to describe a given imagination as such is easily confused with the request to tell of what the imagination is.
IV 125
The "imagination" and the "image in consciousness" have disappeared. The dangers and the difficulties of interpretation increase when rotation and the like is mentioned. There must be a speech on rotation, which does not presuppose that there are images that swirl around in the head.
>Images.