Lexicon of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]


Complaints - Corrections

Table
Concepts
Versus
Sc. Camps
Theses I
Theses II

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III 335
Language/Davidson: Davidson’s criterion: a language may not have an infinite number of basic concepts. Kripke: otherwise it cannot be the first language.
>Language acquisition.
III 338
KripkeVsDavidson: we only have to demand that only a finite number of axioms contain new vocabulary (weaker).
III 338
Truth theory/Kripke: (here): condition i) the axioms define truth implicitly (i.e. we assume that the referential variables have intended domains and the substitutional variables have intended substitutional classes (which implicitly defines a quantity of truths of L.). Condition ii): a) the new axioms must have a true interpretation in the old vocabulary (with the intended interpretation)..., b) there is an equivalence schema for each closed sentence of the object language that only contains old vocabulary. Advantage: the ontology does not contain quantities of expressions of the meta language. Condition iia): is the requirement that there is a new interpretation of the predicates that contains the old ones. Condition iib): guarantees that T(x) contains a single extension (uniqueness). Tarski: Tarski only needs i) for its explicit truth definition (i.e. only old vocabulary).
III 249
Condition (i) is satisfied (without presupposed truth concept) by (4) - (6) in the old vocabulary.
III 347
Truth Theory/Davidson//Kripke: meta language may also contain semantic vocabulary! Translation is also guaranteed if both sides contain semantic vocabulary. Kripke: this is quite different in Tarski: truth and all semantic terms are explicitly defined in non-semantic vocabulary.
>Truth theory, >Axioms/Kripke, >Meta language, >Object language.
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Frank I 32
Mental/physical/Kripke/Frank: the distinction mental/physical teaches the difference of the logical subjects of the physical and the mental. I attribute the physical to a naturalistic vocabulary (syntactic structures), the mental to a mentalist one (semantic structures).
>Naturalism, >Mentalism, >Semantics, >Syntax.

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