Lexicon of Arguments

 

Glüer II 121/22
We can understand because we always know what truth is.

Glüer II 50
Language/Davidson:
1. understanding: for understanding it is basically irrelevant which language the speaker speaks. (DavidsonVsTarski).
Glüer II 51
Each language is accessible through causal relations.
2. It is considered trivial that meaning is conventional. What words and sentences mean is a question of social practice.
DavidsonVs: the thesis of the conventional character of language must be abandoned in the radical interpretation! >Radical Interpretation.
Glüer II 52
Even the idiolect of a nonconformist, freed from all conventions, can in principle be interpreted as long as we can find access to it via causal hypotheses. Conformism facilitates interpretation, but is not a condition of the possibility of understanding.
Malapropisms are misused or mispronounced foreign words or technical terms.
Glüer II 150
Communication/Davidson: is unconventional.
- - -
Horwich I 459
Understanding/Grasping/Wittgenstein/Davidson/Rorty: for Davidson and Wittgenstein grasping in all these cases is detecting the inferential relations between sentences and other sentences of the language - E.g. "that is red" and "there are transfinite cardinal numbers": DavidsonVsDummett: here there is no difference.

Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in:
Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994